Couples filing for divorce in Belgium can opt either for a no-fault divorce trajectory or a consensual trajectory. We develop a simple model of rent-seeking behaviour in divorce.
Introduction
In western society divorce has become widespread, with grave financial impact on personal finance. The past decades divorce laws have shifted from fault-based divorce to no-fault divorce all over Europe and the US. There exists a vast literature on this 'no-fault revolution', which has received extensive attention in the law and economics literature (an overview can be found in Dnes and Rowthorn (2002) ). The literature has mainly focussed on the effect of no-fault unilateral divorce on the number of divorces (for an overview, see Mechoulan (2005) ).
Based on the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960) , Becker et al. (1977) argue that the introduction of unilateral divorce should not have any effect on the number of divorces. Fella et al. (2004) and Chiappori et al. (2007) show micro-theoretically that this only holds under very specific assumptions on production and utility functions. This is confirmed empirically by Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) 1 .
While a very interesting question, working with macro data loses track of the couples going through a divorce and the entire process involved. It is crucial to discern various divorce outcomes and link this to couple characteristics and legal setting. Macro data on divorce rates and the like is readily available from multiple sources, micro data on divorced couples however is quite difficult to obtain. In this paper we develop a simple theoretical framework which looks at household decisions on the division of domestic production. We show that when function specialization occurs, the financially stronger spouse has an incentive to engage in rent-seeking behaviour, as described in Cohen (1987) , by filing for divorce and that this incentive will be larger when the law allows for unilateral divorce and does not impose some sort of punishment mechanism.
We test this conjecture by means of unique data from Belgium, where unilateral no-fault divorce was only recently introduced. We find indeed that couples with a more unequal division of domestic production are more likely to opt for the no-fault trajectory. Moreover, looking at divorce settlement outcomes we find clear evidence that the punishment mechanism protecting the financially weaker spouse against rent-seeking is indeed being applied by judges, as dictated by the law. Because the no-fault trajectory was only recently introduced, pay-offs 1 The history of this debate goes back to Peters (1986) , Allen (1992) , Peters (1992) , Friedberg (1998 ), Wolfers (2006 for the US, and recently Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) and Kneip and Bauer (2009) for Europe. thus further limiting their bargaining power. As Chiappori et al. (2002) point out: when there exists a relative abundance of women, bargaining power and therefore the gains from marriage will shift in favour of the husband. This may in turn affect the behaviour of the husband who might engage in exploitation or appropriation. The figure below clearly shows that from the age of 40 the sex ratio rises steadily indicating relatively more and more single women. In addition some authors claim that the decline of relative male sex drives with age may weaken the bargaining power of women that are married to older men (Allen and Brinig, 1998) .
Thus concluding, there may exist several incentives for rent-seeking behaviour. When parties make considerable investments in marriage, they both will be reluctant to divorce since the benefits from continuing marriage will be larger than the gains from another relationship because the investments they made are sunk and cannot leave the marriage. However, when one partner has made considerable more investments, the other partner might be tempted to take advantage. This temptation may be further boosted by the fact that bargaining power within the marriage changes with sex ratios and relative sex drives. When looking at divorce settlements and divorce trajectory choice we will therefore have to control for this shift in bargaining power by including the sex ratio and age difference (as a proxy for difference in sex drives). Source: Eurostat data for Belgium (2008) A wide range of studies have investigated this phenomenon, and it is within this specific strand of the law and economics literature that this paper should be situated. Brinig and Allen (2000) investigate why most divorce filers in the U.S. are women. They find that this is very consistent with the exploitation and appropriation theses stated above, the latter being the most relevant. They find that the main component of deciding who files for divorce is who gets the children. In other words, since U.S. divorce law has favoured women for custody, women have had an incentive to file for divorce and thus appropriate the property rights over children. Another study based on Norwegian panel data by Tjotta and Vaage (2008) finds that the level of public transfers to divorced families has a significantly positive effect on divorce probability and that the distribution of transfers in favour of the wife increases this probability. Thus not only the type of divorce law matters (fault or no-fault), but also the details of these laws and the institutional framework surrounding them. Therefore we will give a detailed overview of the legal framework in Belgium in section 3. This paper not only looks for the determinants of divorce trajectory choice to test whether couples with a higher degree of function specialisation are more likely to opt for the nofault trajectory, but also analyses the consequences of trajectory choice on the transfers upon divorce. Because of the lack of adequate micro-data, there is little empirical research on divorce transfers and their determinants, and linking these to divorce legislation changes.
The most complete analysis was done by Weiss and Willis (1993) . They follow a cohort of whites who graduated from high school from 1972 to 1985 and estimate the transfer as a function of current and permanent income, duration of marriage, variables indicating the quality of the match and juridical dummy variables. As transfers they consider: child support payments, alimony payments, and the transfer of property. They take the net present value of the three, and perform separate regressions for couples with and without children 4 .
In order to do the settlement regressions, Weiss and Willis first estimate a reduced form probit model. Estimates from this model are then used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio in year of divorces. The inverse Mills ratio is then included in the list of regressors. They find -in line with Teachman and Polonko (1990) and Del Boca and Ribero (1998) -that the transfer tends to increase with the husband's income and to decline with the wife's. Somewhat surprisingly, they find that both the level as well as the sensitivity of transfers to income are quite small.
Weiss and Willis also consider quality of match variables: differences in religion, ethnicity, and age. Weiss and Willis assume that couples of similar traits are less likely to have conflicts within marriage and in divorce and should therefore be considered as control variables.
They find that ex-spouses with the same ethnicity and with a larger age difference have lower transfers, albeit only significant for couples without children. Another quality of match variable is marriage duration. Weiss and Willis cite Cohen (1987) who suggests that "The loss that results from a bad realization of marriage quality is larger, the later it is revealed, since more marriage-specific capital will be accumulated. Therefore, a larger compensation for the wife will be required ". Even so, their results reported in the appendix surprisingly show that transfers fall with the duration of marriage.
When looking at transfers and evaluating them under different trajectories, it is crucial to meticulously study the details of the family law and the surrounding institutional framework. not confound these concepts or treat them as synonyms. In a state with fault-based divorce one spouse has to prove fault of the other in order to acquire divorce. In the 1970s fault grounds were rescinded throughout the United States. Although in many states this change went together with the introduction of unilateral divorce, it is not necessarily so. Consensual divorce is per definition no-fault.
Legal and Institutional Framework in Belgium
When dealing with changes in divorce legislation, it is crucial to define the different possible legal systems. These can be distinguished based on two characteristics: (1) Is fault a necessary ground for divorce? (2) Does divorce require consent of both spouses? The different combinations yield different legal systems, which are depicted in the figure below. This paper will deal with the difference between spouses in a consensual trajectory (4th quadrant) and a no-fault unilateral trajectory (3rd quadrant, further referred to as no-fault) when both are available.
The No-Fault Law of April 2007
In September 2007, Belgium underwent a significant change in divorce legislation. Before, divorce was either possible on fault grounds or consensus of the spouses (in Dutch: Echtscheiding door Onderlinge Toestemming or EOT). Fault grounds were adultery, violence, cruelty and severe insult 5 . The new law (Art. 229 of the Belgian civil code) rescinded these faults as separate grounds for divorce. It kept the consensual divorce as it was, but made the conditions for it more lenient. But the radical change in the new law was the introduction of divorce based on irretrievable breakdown of the marriage (in Dutch: Echtscheiding op grond van Onherstelbare Ontwrichting van het huwelijk or EOO). This is the so-called no-fault divorce 6 . EOO can be obtained consensually or unilaterally. If both spouses agree on filing for divorce, they can immediately obtain a divorce judgment if they have lived apart for at least 6 months. In case they have filed the claim before this period of 6 months is reached, the divorce judgment can be pronounced after both parties appear before court a second time, maximally 3 months after their first appearance.
In case only one of the spouses wants to obtain divorce, there are two possibilities. First, a divorce judgment can be immediately obtained in case the spouses have lived apart for a period of at least 1 year. If this period has not yet been reached, the divorce judgment can be pronounced after the plaintiff appears before court a second time, maximally 1 year after his first appearance. When the other spouse decides to agree with the initial unilateral claim, the shorter terms of the consensual claim can be applied. Second, it is possible to immediately obtain a divorce judgment if proof is furnished of irretrievable breakdown. Here all former fault grounds still play an important role. This implies that the fastest way of 5 Severe insults include insulting statements about the spouse, maintaining an insulting (non-sexual) relationship, refusal of sexuality, expressing homosexuality, neglecting the household or contributions to the marriage, alcohol or drug abuse, love declarations to a third party, religious fanaticism, but also desertion or abandonment with malicious content.
6 Gonzalez and Viitanen (2009) obtaining a divorce is through a claim by mutual consent. When a unilateral claim is filed, the divorce proceeding can be quickened by reaching a consent between spouses. Indeed, spouses may/will pressure the other one to agree with divorce in order to obtain a judgment more speedily.
One could argue that consensual EOT and the consensual procedure of the new no-fault law are very comparable, since they both require both spouses to want a divorce. Yet, there is a crucial difference. The EOT requires that spouses reach an arrangement on all consequences of divorce (custody, alimony, property division, etc.). A no-fault procedure allows for divorce to be granted without having arranged anything. Partial arrangements (say on children or property division) can be ratified in court, and subjects not agreed upon are settled in court.
Furthermore, ratified arrangements should still be considered as temporary, since they can always be changed in the final judgment by the court.
Duty of Maintenance under the New Law and Enforceability
Under the old fault-based law, the 'not guilty' spouse was entitled to alimony. The amount was settled in court such that the receiver could maintain the same standard of life prior to divorce. Alimony was in principle perpetual. Under the new no-fault law, only those spouses who are in a state of neediness are entitled to alimony. The concept of neediness is defined rather vaguely in the law, and thus gives more discretionary power to the courts when determining who is and who is not entitled to alimony. Art. 301 §3 states that the courts should take into account the income and potential income of the spouses. Moreover, the duration of alimony is on principle limited to the duration of marriage, but it is stipulated that:
"in case of extraordinary circumstances, such as a very long cohabitation prior to marriage, the duration of alimony can be extended ex post, if the receiver is still in a state of neediness because of circumstances out of his or her control " 7 . This again increases the discretionary power of the courts. However, an upper bound for alimony remains: alimony payments may not exceed one third of the net income of the alimony payer. Finally, even though the new law is supposedly no-fault, the proof of certain faults 8 still can be called upon as ground for not having to pay alimony (Art. 301 §2). easier to obtain and marriage contracts became less enforceable. However, it seems that the legislator has understood that this may indeed lead to rent-seeking and has anticipated increased rent-seeking by also enacting a mechanism to compensate the victims of rent-seeking for their losses. Specifically, art. 301 §3 subsection 2 states that when determining partner alimony the court should also take into account the decline of income of the spouses. To evaluate the magnitude of this decline, the law stipulates that the judge should take into account marriage duration, age of the spouses, and their behaviour during marriage concerning the organization of the family's needs and care for the children. The question is whether this compensation will indeed be granted in reality. If the data indeed show that a compensation exists, then the net rent-seeking effect of the no-fault law is mitigated.
Theoretical Model
To further illustrate the problem of quasi-rent destruction as in Cohen (1987) we develop a theoretical framework to analyse time-varying rents in the family. We start from a very simple multi-period unitary model. Time can be spent on labour market production (t l i ) or on domestic market production (t d i ) and the sum of both equals 1. In every period a certain amount of time t d i has to be spent on domestic production. Labour market income I i depends on the time spent on the labour market, current human capital h i and a constant wage rate ω. The most important feature of this simple model is human capital accumulation (equation 4). Human capital in period i depends on the time spent on the labour market and the stock of human capital in period i − 1. There is therefore a sort of learning-by-doing mechanism that makes people more efficient, and thus raising their (efficiency) wages. Parameterizing α < 1 and φ < 1 gives us decreasing returns to time spent on the labour market. The true value of α will depend on the duration of the period considered. One could imagine that for a period of 1 year, α will be rather low, but if a period of 20 years is considered α will be close to 1 or even larger than 1.
The equations above are valid for both spouses, man and woman. We therefore add the superscripts m and f. Labour income is then pooled so the family income is just the sum of the labour income of both spouses. Assume that in the first period both spouses start with an equal endowment of human capital thus h m 1 = h f 1 . The unitary family maximizes its intertemporal family income:
s.t.
Maximizing with respect to t l,m i and t
l,f i
and also setting α = 1 for the sake of simplicity yields the following first order conditions (FOC):
We see that the time spent on the labour market negatively depends on t d i and the human capital of the other spouse. The higher the own human capital the more time will be spent on the labour market. The FOC's also show that when the initial human capital is equal and the division of time spent on the labour market -and thus also the time spent on domestic production -is completely egalitarian the family income is in it's minimum (see figure 3) . If cooperation exists then the spouses will decide on which spouse will take on all the domestic production. Using this simple framework we can now simulate intertemporal family behaviour in a setting where the obligatory domestic production (t d i ) first rises and then steadily declines over time. As Becker (1991) points out: even minor comparative advantages may lead to substantial specialzation. Moreover, Vagstad (2001) states that similar to comparative advantages learning-by-doing, both in labour market production and domestic production, will lead to extensive degrees of specialization. In our model full specialization will therefore be optimal.
However, since no comparative advantage exists in the illustration of our model (both initial human capital endowments are equal), the assignment of who specializes in which production will be random. Panel C of table 1 represents the case in which domestic production is equally shared, whereas the upper part (Panel A) is the case in which one of the spouses is completely providing the domestic production. In this simulation the husband provides the domestic production, but again, if no comparative advantage exists this assignment is random. We clearly see that for this parametrization of φ and α complete specialization is more efficient. If however α would be very close to zero, the described human capital accumulation mechanism would be weakened as such that -over time -the egalitarian division would be equally efficient. Note: calculated for ω = 1, φ = 0.5, α = 0.9 and a discount rate of 10% per period
The problem of the quasi-rents becomes evidently clear in table 1. The quasi-rent is defined as "a return to one party to a contract, above what the party could receive if the contract could be dissolved at will at that moment" Cohen (1987) . The contemporaneous quasi-rent (CQR)
for the financially stronger spouse can thus in each period be calculated as the difference between the family income divided by 2, and the personal income one would attain if he or she would have to provide all the domestic production, given the current stock of human capital (equation 13). Since spouses are not myopic they also take into account (discount) future quasi-rents. The quasi-rent in period i can therefore be written as:
If the contract could be dissolved at will at any given period, no cooperation would exist as in In summary our model demonstrates that through specialization in marriage, a family can attain a higher income. While specialization might seem somewhat a thing of the past, many authors (see e.g. (Vagstad, 2001) ) point out that modern household still exhibit a substantial degree of specialization where males are predominantly specializing in labour market production. There exist extensive literature on the wage premium married males attain. Empirical evidence (see e.g. (Korenman and Neumark, 1991) or (Hersch and Startton, 2000) ) suggests that marriage makes men more productive, the causality however is less clear.
The wage premium could be due to selection: more productive males are more likely to enter marriage. Another possibility is that marriage allows married men to allocate greater time and effort to market work and therefore becomes more productive. Bardasi and Taylor (2008) find using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) that married men in Britain enjoy a wage premium of 17% over single men. They find that about half of this premium can be attributed to selection, whereas the ability to specialize can account for about one-third of the premium. Moreover, Bardasi and Taylor (2008) demonstrate that per household chore the woman is responsible, the man's wage rises with 2% 10 .
Once the required domestic production t d i drops to a low enough level, the quasi-rent will decline and might even be negative depending on the parameterization of α. The financially stronger spouse then considers whether the quasi-rent plus the costs of divorce is larger than a certain cutoff value θ which can be different in each period i.
Quasi-Rent
where
The question posed in equation 14 goes as follows: is the quasi-rent in the marriage for the financially stronger partner larger than the incentive to divorce θ. It is trivial that θ will depend negatively on love, and positively on the availability outside options (i.e. the sex ratio). In our simple model, legal variables will also have an impact. Two key features of divorce legislation are mentioned here: the required separation time and the degree of unilaterality. The lower the required separation period the faster the divorce will be finalised, and the faster people can start their 'new life'. Unilaterality determines which one of the two spouses has the most bargaining power. If it is only possible to obtain divorce consensually 10 In the BHPS men and women were asked 'Could you please say who mostly does these household jobs here? Is it mostly yourself, mostly your spouse/partner, or is the work shared equally? (1) Grocery shopping;
(2) Cooking; (3) Washing and ironing; (4) Cleaning/hoovering. To proxy function specialization in our data, we took a slightly different approach which will be elaborated in section 5.2. the spouses who wants divorce the least has more bargaining power since he or she will have to be compensated in order to allow for divorce. If divorce can also be obtained unilaterally the bargaining power shifts to the spouse who wants divorce the most: the spouse who wants divorce will now have to be compensated by the other not to file for divorce. Thus, the cost for the divorce filer will be lower.
If the quasi-rent is sufficiently high, divorce will not take place. If on the other hand the quasirent is low -as in period 4 and 5 in our simulation -or even negative and θ is sufficiently high, rent appropriation will take place. With regard to legal changes our model predicts that if the governing divorce law is changed making divorce faster and easier obtainable by not requiring consent of both spouses, more rent-seeking will take place (anecdotal evidence of this can be seen in the divorce rates). We would also expect to find those rent-seekers in the no-fault unilateral trajectory since no consent is required. This hypothesis will be checked in section 6.1.
Testable Implications
Our model and the simulations in table 1 put forward some clear-cut testable implications.
As mentioned in section 3, Belgian legislation provides a unilateral and a consensual divorce trajectory. Since no consent is required in the unilateral trajectory, those spouses engaging in rent-seeking will more likely opt for the unilateral trajectory. We therefore can expect couples with a higher difference in the division of household chores and higher wage difference to be more present in the unilateral trajectory. Secondly, comparing panel A and panel D of table 1, we clearly see that when t d i is lower -e.g. because no children are present -the quasi-rent for the financially stronger partner is far less volatile. Ergo, rent-seeking is far less likely. We therefore expect to find more couples with children in the unilateral trajectory.
Our simple model also predicts that if divorce laws are changed allowing for unilateral divorce, the divorce rates will spike since rent-seeking behaviour will increase (see the right spike in figure 4 ). In fact this is valid for all legal changes which lower the cost of divorce 11 . However, this result can only be temporary. In the long run, spouses will anticipate rent-seeking behaviour and they will therefore be less inclined to fully specialize, thus reducing the risk of rent-seeking.
Data

Data Collection
The lack of empirical work on divorce transfers is mainly due to the lack of detailed microdata. We use a unique Belgian data set collected by the IPOS project. The IPOS project is a cooperation between Ghent University and the Catholic University of Louvain, sponsored by the IWT (Institute for the Promotion of Innovation by Science and Technology in Flanders).
IPOS stands for "Interdisciplinary Project for the Optimization of Separation Trajectories".
The survey results from a cooperation of psychologists, lawyers and economists. Thus, apart from a psychological and juridical part, this survey also pays attention to the economic aspects of divorce and transfers. All spouses who divorced between March 2008 and March 2009 in the courts of 4 Flemish cities (Antwerp, Ghent, Kortrijk and Mechelen) were given a brochure in which was asked to participate in a study concerning divorce. If respondents replied favourably, they were contacted within 3 weeks to fill out an electronic questionnaire.
Because all people who divorce in Belgium have to go to court at least once, our recruitment 11 The divorce rate also spiked in 1994 when the procedure was shortened and the number of required appearances was reduced. Prior to 1994 divorce legislation's purpose was to discourage divorce and try to still reconcile the spouses. Not all people contacted in court were willing to cooperate. Given that participation is voluntary and the stressful situation (most) soon to be ex-spouses find themselves in, one would expect a very low participation rate. Nevertheless, of the 8,896 distributed brochures 3924 (44%) responded favourably. There was an additional dropout after being contacted (not willing to participate anymore, wrong contact data or annulment of the divorce) leaving an overall participation rate of 20.8%. Our data are self-reported data and should be interpreted with the needed care. Although the data-collection procedure has its drawbacks, it gives all divorcing people the same chance of participation and should thus be preferred over convenient sampling methods.
Descriptive Statistics
The IPOS data set contains 2,146 surveys of which 1,850 fully completed. However, when recruiting participants in court, both spouses had the opportunity to join the survey. Therefore, data on an ex-couple i, j could be included twice in our regressions biasing standard errors downwards. To cope with this, if both spouses participated one entry was randomly deleted. This leaves us with N = 1,594 of which 709 men and 885 women with an average age of 45.57 and 42.25 respectively. The respondents, both men and women, were fairly high educated: about 41% had had some form of higher education.
Average relationship duration was about 16.5 years. Average marriage duration was about 14.5 years, with a median of 13.08 years, which is well consistent with the data of the Belgium National Institute of Statistics (NIS) 12 that stated a median duration of 13.00 years in 2007.
Average age upon marriage was 29.40 for men and 26.26 for women. Again, this 3 years age difference is consistent with NIS data.
The histogram with an Epanechnikov kernel distribution below in figure 5 clearly indicates that the hazard of divorce reaches its peak in the first five years of marriage 13 . As control variables in our estimations we use different indicators of quality of the match, namely dif-12 http://statbel.fgov.be/ 13 This distribution was also found to be not statisticaly different from the distribution of marital duration as reported by the NIS. with marriage duration, we also control for the age at marriage. It is assumed that couples who marry at later age and thus invested more time in screening possible mates have more stable relationships and are more likely to cooperate if the marriage breaks (Weiss and Willis, 1993) . Marriage duration is a crucial but ambiguous item. On the one hand a long marriage duration suggest a more stable relationship, so bargaining upon divorce might be more fluid. On the other hand, as mentioned before, the loss from a divorce is larger when more marriage-specific capital has been accumulated. The vast majority of people in the sample, 75.47%, report to have one child or more with their ex-spouse, which is also very comparable to statistics provided by the NIS (75.8%).
Self-Potential Sacrifice
Self-potential sacrifice is defined as sacrificing a labour market career to focus on domestic production. It is therefore natural that this is highly correlated with wage difference between spouses. To see why, we go back to the Beckerian theory on optimal allocation of time in households. According to Becker, the decision on household production or labour market production is driven by comparative advantages. Thus, sacrifice of self-potential in the labour market is jointly determined with the wage difference. Therefore wage difference is an indirect way to measure self-potential sacrifice. In this paper we also investigate a more direct measure:
we simply asked participants a series of questions on who did various household chores prior to divorce and constructed a scale. Our approach differs slightly from Bardasi and Taylor (2008) in the sense that we allow for more variation in household chores, and in the division of household chores.
More specifically, we construct the direct measure of self-potential sacrifice based on 7 questions regarding household chores before divorce, namely staying at home when the children were ill, cleaning and washing, food and cooking, buying groceries, taking care of the children, leisure activities of the children (playing, transport), diverse chores in the house (garden maintenance, fixing things). Respondents indicate on a 5-point Likert scale their share in these chores on average in the last year before filing. This 5-point scale, ranges from 'I did a lot more than my ex ' to 'My ex did a lot more than me'. We construct a measure of the inequality of distribution of household chores. Ex-couples without children received a score of 3 on child related questions, equivalent to 'We both did just as much'. We sum the answers on these 7 chores to arrive at a sum between 7 and 35.
We then normalise this variable by the following formula:
Let us clarify this using the following three extreme cases. (A) A spouse reports on all questions that she/he did a lot more than the ex-spouse, i.e. a score of 1 on each of the 7 questions. Using the formula above the difference in sacrifice will therefore be 1, being the maximum score possible. (B) A spouse reports on all questions that her/his ex did a lot more,
i.e. a score of 5 on each of the 7 questions. The difference in sacrifice will therefore also be 1. (C) A spouse reports on all questions that she/he did just as much as the ex-spouse, i.e. a score of 3 on each of the 7 questions. Applying the formula, the difference in sacrifice will be 0, the minimum score.
An issue with such a measure is of course that couples are self-reporting their own share in household duties and might tend to overestimate their personal share. This tendency to overreport might lead to biased results in our estimations. We discuss this problem in more detail in Appendix 1.
Divorce Trajectory and Divorce Transfers
Divorce transfers essentially consist of three different elements. There is a property transfer, a child support payment, and an alimony payment. Weiss and Willis (1993) to a week-week arrangement, both parents will contribute the same percentage of their labour income. Thus, the parent with a higher income will contribute more. If the child stays longer with one parent, the other parent will contribute more, etc. It is therefore not surprising that the average income of the spouse paying child support has an average labour income e264
higher than the spouse receiving child support 14 .
Property transfers are a different issue altogether. We argue that most property transfers as considered by Weiss and Willis (1993) are, as a matter of fact, not transfers. Suppose two ex-spouses own a house together. Upon divorce it is decided that the wife gets the house and pays her ex-husband half of the value of the house. Can we therefore conclude that there was a transfer of property to the wife? And was there a cash transfer to the wife? Clearly not.
Only if shares of property are sold among ex-spouses at a price that differs from the market value (or if the property stays in mutual possession but only one has the right of use and enjoyment) one can speak of a transfer by means of property. It goes without saying that the analysis of property settlements requires fair market values on houses. Since these data are not available to us, property will not be considered in our analysis.
Child support and alimony payments are usually, but not necessarily, monthly payments.
In order to cope with (the few) lump sum payments, we calculate the monthly equivalent of lump sum payments assuming that people are indifferent between a monthly payment or its lump sum equivalent. The new law effective since September 2007 stipulates that the duration of alimony is limited to marriage duration. We therefore calculate the equivalent expected monthly alimony payments, using a yearly discount rate of 4%, as the sum of a geometric series with limited number of periods namely the months married. We use the following formula:
where Y i,j denotes the transfer from individual i to j and δ is the monthly discount rate. n 14 Data on labour income was winsorised to the 99th percentile; 382 missing data, were imputed. Results do not alter when those observations are not included and are available on request.
denotes the years of marriage of the couple i, j. For alimony payments, N = 1405. The average monthly alimony payment was e76.07. This low number results from the large number of zero-observations (1149). In our sample we find that alimony is payed in 10.6% of the cases (N = 169) 15 . The average monthly alimony payment given a non-zero payment was e593.24. A large number of zero-observations require special estimation techniques, discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.3. The average child support payment (N = 799) was e239.27. The number of zero-observations here was considerably smaller (197).
As for divorce trajectories, the vast majority (1,159 people) opted for the consensual divorce trajectory (EOT), 327 people opted for the new no-fault trajectory (EOO), and 108 people opted for consensual divorce but switched to an EOO procedure. As mentioned above, three procedures can be followed within the no-fault trajectory. Of the 435 people following a no-fault procedure, merely 35 (8.05%) indicated that divorce was by joint request. The vast majority indicated that they followed the unilateral no-fault trajectory. Because only a small percentage followed the no-fault consensual EOO trajectory, these couples will not be considered separately in the remainder of this paper. Table 3 presents summary statistics and definitions of those variables used in this paper.
15 Bastaits et al. (2011) find in a relatively small sample of divorcees in Flanders that alimony is paid in only 6.6% of all cases. The higher probability of alimony payments might be due to our data collection technique in which we went to the court and surveyed divorcing couples physically present in court. On the other hand, Hemelsoen and Schoors (2010) find in a random sample of over 1000 mutual consent divorce agreements that in roughly 8% of all cases alimony is paid which is very comparable to our sample (8.79%). Because of the specific characteristics of the data, estimating the choice of divorce trajectory, child support and partner alimony requires a specific methodological approach which we will discuss in the following paragraphs.
Choice of Divorce Trajectory
The choice of divorce trajectory is dichotomous: one either chooses the no-fault unilateral (EOO) or the consensual (EOT) trajectory. Consequently, a binary outcome model is required. Using a standard probit model we estimate the following equation:
As explanatory variables we use a series of variables which indicate a discrepancy in bargaining power, control variables indicating the quality of the match and variables indicating conflict prior to divorce. W age is the difference in monthly labour income expressed in thousands of Euros, Sacrif is the inequality in domestic production, SexRatio is the ratio of single women over single men per age category of the husband 16 . F amInc is the monthly family income expressed in thousands of Euros. As quality of match variables we include the presence of children, the age difference, the age of the man, the difference in highest attained diploma and the duration of the marriage. As conflict variables we include the frequency of conflict and financial conflict prior to divorce as well as a dummy indicating whether or not both spouses agreed to divorce. This dummy will be zero when one of the spouses preferred to stay married.
If it is the case that couples with a greater discrepancy in self-potential sacrifice tend to opt more for the no-fault trajectory then both the coefficients for W age and Sacrif should be greater than zero. Furthermore, one could reasonably expect that if spouses disagree on getting divorced and if prior to divorce there was more conflict, the chances of a unilateral no-fault divorce are larger. The sex ratio indicates possible imbalances in the marriage market per age cohort. A sex ratio larger than one indicates a relative shortage of men and therefore 16 Considering the sex ratio per 5 year cohort does not alter any result reported in this paper.
reducing the outside options for women, whereas a sex ratio smaller than one indicates a relative shortage of women. Family income is a more ambiguous variable. On the one hand the higher the family income the more there is to lose when disagreeing. On the other hand, it is not worth fighting about the share of the pie, if the pie is too small. The estimations should indicate which effect dominates.
Since we have no data before the introduction of the no-fault divorce, we cannot properly analyse the consequences of introducing no-fault divorce. It is nonetheless crucial that the no-fault trajectory was recently introduced. When analysing trajectory choice in a setting where both trajectories and their payoffs are well-known by people (or at least their legal representatives), expected payoffs should be controlled in the estimation of trajectory choice.
In our case we should include a measure for the difference in expected alimony payments in the two trajectories in the analysis, e.g. the ratio of the mean monthly alimony payment in both trajectories. This would mean that trajectory choice and partner alimony payments are endogenous variables. But, since our data window is very short and starts precisely after the introduction of the no-fault trajectory, and since the legislator left the judges with quite some discretionary power regarding alimony payment in this new trajectory, relative expected payoffs were unknown to the agents (divorcees, their legal representatives and judges) in our data window and need therefore not be taken into account when choosing a divorce trajectory. Since alimony payments can be considered as unrelated to trajectory choice in our data window, we can think of our data as a natural experiment that allows us to capture the pure effects of rent-seeking on the chosen trajectory and on the alimony payments. Table 4 reports the marginal effects (dy/dx) of a probit regression 17 estimating the chance of choosing the no-fault trajectory (EOO).
17 A semi-nonparametric estimatorà la Gallant and Nychka (1987) and a semi-parametric estimatorà la Klein and Spady (1993) yield similar results, available on request. The coefficients in the table above should be interpreted in terms of the change in probability a couple opts for the no-fault trajectory caused by a change of one unit of the explanatory variable. We find that both wage and sacrifice difference have a positive coefficient which is statistically different from zero, confirming our rent-seeking hypothesis. In the most complete specification (controlling for the quality of match both indirectly and directly) a couple with a complete inegalitarian division of domestic production has a 13.8% higher probability of opting for the no-fault trajectory than a couple with a complete egalitarian division. An additional wage difference of e1000 raises the probability with 6.2%. The sex ratio is also strongly related with the no-fault trajectory, which is in line with our model.
Also the children dummy has a positive statistically significant coefficient. Thus, in line with the predictions of our model (see the comparison of panels A and D in Table 1 ) and Brinig and Allen (2000) the presence of children also increases the likelihood of opting for the no-fault trajectory, in our case with 6.6%. As expected, couples in the no-fault unilateral trajectory reported higher conflicts and disagreement on the decision to divorce. Subjects with a higher family income (expressed in thousands of Euros) prior to divorce are less likely to opt for the no-fault trajectory, indicating that the first effect -the higher the family income the more there is to lose by failing to consent -outweighs the other.
Our results for the no fault trajectory are in line with the thesis that the partner who specialised on the labour market and has the highest labour income appropriates the future quasi-rents of the partner who specialised on domestic production and has the lowest labour income. We do not know whether the partner who specialised in labour market production is in fact the one who files for divorce and, in doing so, chooses the legal trajectory, but filing information may not reveal the identity of the instigator of divorce. As Fella et al. (2004) correctly point out: the choice couples face upon divorce is not between divorce and staying happily married, but rather between divorce and continuing a rather uncooperative form of marriage. The financialy stronger spouse could be more reluctant to share his/her labour income. Moreover, many practitioners pointed out that the marital contract can also be breached while remaining nominally married, thus forcing the other spouse to start the no-fault procedure in order to get some compensation. Indeed, under the new no-fault law of 2007, living apart for at least 6 months is an important condition to obtain an immediate divorce judgment (see higher). The true instigator of divorce is therefore not necessarily the plaintiff. The question remains how this rent-seeking behaviour will impact the transfers upon divorce.
Child Support Transfers
First of all, we will structure the dataset as such that individual i will always be the payer and individual j the receiver. The monthly child support transfer, Y i,j is therefore ∈ + . All other variables -if person specific -will also be structured in the same way, from the payers' point of view. Because data on child support transfers are ∈ + often -and wrongfully -a tobit setup is used. However, a tobit setup is only justified when observations are censored (i.e. observations are zero, but could be less than zero). One could also argue that there is a possible selection effect in couples who set a zero transfer and a non-zero transfer. As mentioned in the previous section, child support payments in general are not and should not be as subjective to relative bargaining power as partner alimony. Not surprisingly, when using a selection model we do not find evidence of selection. To cope with the 197 zero-observations and in the absence of selection we use a two-part model or the hurdle model. In the first step
we estimate a probit model on dY . The second step is a linear regression of ln(Y ) conditional on Y > 0. Given the assumption that the two parts are independent, the joint likelihood for the two parts equals just the sum of the two log likelihoods. Of course heteroskedasticity and non-normality of the error terms could be present, but unlike the tobit MLE estimator, neither is required for consistency of the estimator. We use the obvious exclusion restrictions, namely in the first step we use data on the couple, whereas in the second step the data can be conditioned on which spouse is the payer and receiver. In the second step we estimate the following equation:
As bargaining variables we include the same ones as we used when estimating the trajectory choice plus the monthly wage of the payer of the child support and a series of variables related to children. The children-related variables are a dummy indicating whether or not the child(ren) reside equally with both parents, the number of children and the age of the youngest child. The estimated model also contains a dummy variable indicating a non-zero spousal alimony transfer and the trajectory.
The Belgian law stipulates that when it comes to child support payments "parents should contribute proportionate to their resources 18 ". Although this is a vague concept since it is not clearly defined what these resources are, we expect the wage difference to be positively related to child support transfers. Furthermore, it is logical that the more children and the more unequal the child's residence with both parents is, the higher the amount of child support. Conflict variables on the other hand should not matter. As mentioned before, in an univariate setting we found no statistically significant correlation between partner alimony and child support. This is tested here in a multivariate setting by including a dummy which is one if partner alimony is greater than zero. Also, a quadratic term of marriage duration was included to cope with possible non-linearities.
The estimates in table 5 present the results from the second step of the two-part hurdle model. Since we take the natural logarithm of child support payments as dependent variable the coefficients in table 5 can be readily interpreted as elasticities. Belgian law is rather vague on child support transfers and only stipulates that ex-spouses should pay according to their respective means. Surprisingly we find that not so much wage difference but the level of the wage of the payer 19 is relevant for child support payments: if the wage of the payer rises with e1000 monthly child support will be 19.4% higher. Payments also increase with the number of children and if the child does not reside an equal time with both parents. The older the youngest child, the higher the amount of the monthly child support payment. The sex ratio is statistically significant in columns (2) to (4). However, this result is spurious. The sex ratio is attributed based on the age of the man. There exists therefore a high correlation whith age of the man and other variables such as number of children, age of the child and marriage duration. We also find that marital duration is positively (though concavely) influencing the magnitude of child support transfers. A possible explanation for this is that the longer a marriage last, the more compassion has grown between the spouses and the more spouses will agree on what is best for the children because they can more correctly estimate the true cost of children. Conflict before divorce does not have an impact on child support payments. So, neither the followed divorce trajectory nor the sacrifice scale seem not to have an impact on child support payments. Also the conflict variables are (fortunately) not significant.
Partner Alimony
The descriptive statistics showed that for a vast majority of the couples in the dataset no partner alimony was paid. If the people who have a positive transfer are not randomly selected from the total dataset population, a selection bias might exist. However, when estimating a Tobit type II (Heckman) model nor the full ML estimation nor the more robust two-step approach provides evidence for the presence of selection: a likelihood ratio test of independent equations after a full ML estimation yields a p-value of 0.39 and the Mills' ratio in the twostep approach is highly insignificant (p-value of 0.88). We therefore continue using a two-part (hurdle) model. Since the hurdle model does not eliminate the problem of heteroskedasticity 19 Since both wage difference and wage of the payer are used in our specification, wage difference actually proxies the wage of the receiver. Nonetheless our findings remain unaltered, namely that the wage of the payer is the pre-dominant explanatory factor.
and tests reject a constant variance we use the White-estimator to obtain heteroskedasticityrobust errors. Similar to child support transfer, data on partner alimony will be structured as such that individual i will always be the payer and individual j the receiver. Therefore the monthly partner alimony payment too will be ∈ + .
The first step estimates:
In the second step we report robust OLS estimates of the following equation:
In section 3.2 we discussed the duty of maintenance under the new no-fault law. According to the law only an ex-spouse who finds himself/herself in a state of neediness is entitled to spousal alimony. Thus we expect that both wage difference (+) and family income (-) matter. The law also states that when setting the amount of alimony the courts should take into account the decline in income by taking into account marriage duration, age of the spouses, and their behaviour concerning domestic production. How marriage duration should be taken into account is not specified in the law. On the one hand the later a bad match is revealed the greater the damages. On the other hand the new no-fault law stipulates that the duration of alimony payments is limited to the duration of the marriage. Which effect will dominate is a priori unclear. Table 6 reports marginal effects of a probit regression estimating the first part of the hurdle model (equation 20). As expected, the state of neediness is important: if the wage difference rises with e1000 the probability of setting a non-zero alimony transfer rises with 6.8% and per e1000 more of monthly family income, the probability decreases with 1.8%. Also the mere fact of following the no-fault trajectory raises the probability of a non-zero alimony transfer with 4.6%. For marriage duration we find a positive sign: if the bad quality of a match is revealed later, the damage will be larger and hence the likelihood of compensation rises. Table 7 reports the second part of the hurdle model (equation 21). We find that partner alimony increases with the wage difference. The size of the coefficient is quite sizable: an additional wage difference of e1000 raises the alimony with 39.1%. Family income has the opposite sign as in the first step indicating that neediness is indeed used to determine who is entitled to alimony, but has the exact opposit effect when determining the amount. Alimony payments also rise with the age of the man and the duration of the marriage. Both variables are related to wealth gathered during marriage.
Art. 301 §3 subsection 2 stipulates that the judge should take into account the former spouses' behaviour during marriage with regard to the organization of the family's needs and care for the children when determining the amount of alimony. We see this as a compensation for victims of rent-seeking. We indeed find that the difference in household production (Sacrif ) matters considerably for alimony payments. Couples with a complete unequal distribution of household chores have between 39.5% and 77.2% higher alimony payments than couples with a complete egalitarian distribution of household chores. Judges seem to implement the compensation mechanism rather consistently. Moreover, controlling for all other factors, the alimony payments are a whopping 48.9% higher if couples divorce under the no-fault law 20 .
We think of this as an additional penalty to discourage rent-seeking behaviour. Therefore the long run equilibrium effect of the no-fault law on rent-seeking may be rather limited. Once partners, that seek divorce for the purpose of rent-seeking, and their legal representatives fully understand they have to pay compensation for the appropriation of quasi-rents in the form of higher alimony, the net incentive effect of the no-fault on rent-seeking may become rather dim.
20 Investigating the effect of the no-fault trajectory we ignored the fact that the chance of ending up in no-fault trajectory is influenced by other independent variables such as sacrifice. A way to cope with this is to orthogonalize the trajectory choice with respect to the variables given in In this paper we analyse whether self-potential sacrifice during marriage, i.e. substituting domestic production for labour market production, is related to rent-seeking behaviour during divorce. According to Cohen (1987 Cohen ( , 2002 and Parkman (1992) the spouse sacrificing most of his/her labour market career is expected to receive quasi-rents from marriage in a later stage of marriage. This gives the spouse specialised in labour market production an incentive to maximise his/her rent by filing unilaterally for divorce after his or her quasi-rents from marriage were extracted in an early stage of marriage, in this way appropriating the future quasi-rents of his/her former spouse. We hypothesise that this rent-seeking behaviour is facilitated by the existence of a no-fault unilateral divorce trajectory. We analyse this conjecture by means of unique Belgian data, where no-fault unilateral divorce was only recently introduced. Using a standard probit model we indeed find that couples with a higher inequality of self-potential sacrifice, measured both directly and indirectly through wage discrepancies, are more likely to divorce under the no-fault divorce trajectory than under the consensual divorce trajectory. We can therefore not reject the hypothesis that the no-fault trajectory facilitates rent-seeking behaviour.
Interestingly, the legislator anticipated this rent-seeking behaviour and introduced a paragraph in the new law on no-fault divorce, which stipulates literally that partner alimony transfers should take into account the age of the spouses, marriage duration and sacrifice. By means of a two-part (hurdle) model we find that (1) partner alimony transfers are more likely if marriage duration is long, (2) that partner alimony transfers are more likely for no-fault divorces (3) that alimony transfers are higher for divorces characterised by more pronounced self sacrifice, both if measured indirectly by the wage difference between spouses (the easiest and most observable measure of self-sacrifice available to judges) and directly through our measure of unequal distribution of household chores and 4) that there is an additional heavy penalty for no-fault divorces in terms of higher alimony. In this sense the legislator seems to have succeeded in at least limiting the amount of rent-extraction through the introduction of no fault unilateral divorce. The question now remains if the punishment mechanism is effective. One could argue that the punishment is not effective since we still find a discrepancy in wage and sacrifice difference between trajectories. However, since the no-fault unilateral law was only introduced a couple of months before our sampling period the possibility remains that indeed the punishment mechanism is effective, but that equilibrium has not been reached yet. If so, we would in equilibrium expect to find no difference in wage and sacrifice difference between trajectories.
Child support payments on the other hand are not determined by wage differences or direct self-sacrifice, but by the wage of the payer and residence of the child(ren). Moreover, child support payments depend neither on the divorce trajectory nor on the presence of partner alimony transfers.
A Appendix 1: Possible Biases in Self-Reported Sacrifice and
Robustness
In the paper we use two measures of self-potential: wage difference and the self-reported division of household chores. It is not unthinkable that the latter might be biased because people tend to overestimate their own share in domestic production. As explained in section 5.2, if both spouses of a divorcing couple filled out the questionnaire we discarded at random data from one spouse to avoid biasing standard errors downwards. However, these data on both couples (N = 508) come very useful to test if there is in fact a significant overreporting of the own share in domestic production. Remember respondents indicated on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 'I did a lot more than my ex ' to 'My ex did a lot more than me') their share in 7 household chores in the last year before filing. If there is no overreporting the sum over all chores of both couples would be 42 (e.g. if both spouses reported that household chores were devided equally they would both score 21). Any score over 42 can be considered as overreporting. The percentage deviation of 42 is ploted in the histogram below. The question now remains is this overreporting systematic? In other words, is overreporting linked to other variables such as e.g. the level of pre-divorce conflict? To test this we take the percentage deviation from 42 as independent variable and use the level of sacrifice (on a 0 to 1 scale), age difference, divorce trajectory, pre-divorce conflict and financial conflict as explanatory variables. We do find evidence that the bias is positively linked to the level of sacrifice, divorce trajectory, pre-divorce conflict and financial conflict, though the explanatory power of the regression is quite small. We then have to check if this would alter our results.
Making the extreme assumption that everyone overreports, we take the coefficients obtained in our regression model back to our original data set and correct for the bias in reported sacrifice. We then truncate sacrifice from below since it is possible to have a sacrifice level below zero and rerun all regressions. We find that our results do not alter significantly. Only the coefficient of sacrifice reported in table 7 seems to be somewhat different (e.g. in Table 7 column 7 we now find a coefficient of 0. Significance levels : * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%
To check whether our estimates are not driven by an underlying unobserved characteristic (people who are innate selfish would be less inclined to do many household chores -and thus have a higher sacrifice difference -and also more likely to file for divorce unilaterally), we condition our data on certain subsamples which could be considered a proxy for innate selfishness. More specifically we condition our sample on: (a) the presence of kids (b) 
